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1. Introduction1 
 
The effect that WO have on investments is a debated topic, and it has been conjectured as 
either benign—the voice face of WO (Freeman and Medoff, 1984)—or adverse—the rent-
seeking (Grout, 1984), the Luddist and the monopoly face of WO (Lindblom, 1948). Concerns 
on the sign of the WO-I correlation have been raised also in the field of strategic R&D (Beath et 
al., 1989). Moreover, once wages are allowed into the picture with positive feedbacks on 
productivity (Solow, 1979), rent-seeking may even foster investments. Addison and Teixeira 
(2019: 111) have indeed recalled that «unions may generate worker cooperation […] However, 
the threat of credible punishment implies bargaining power and in turn implies rent-seeking 
behavior ». In this view, rent-seeking prevents employers to hold-up employees, who may be 
thus induced to reciprocate and augment their effort. Similarly, if WO play a role in affecting the 
non-monetary components of job-satisfaction—e.g. by favouring practices that increase 
workers’ well-being—the feedback effect on productivity may be further enhanced.  
This seems actually to be the case. Cotti et al. (2014) show indeed that unions enhance 
workers’ well-being, while Antonioli et al. (2011) find a positive effect of cooperative IR and 
organizational innovations on employees’ satisfaction2. The latter is then positively correlated 
with productivity (Böckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2012; Bryson et al., 2017; DeNeve et al., 2019) 
and with practices emphasizing flexibility and autonomy (Holm and Lorenz, 2014). In addition, 
personnel psychologists and HR management scholars have long insisted on the importance of 
getting the right fit between individual and job characteristics (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005; 
Felstead et al., 2015). This may either occur because higher satisfaction associates with higher 
morale (Strauss, 1968) or because employees are more confident in performing tasks they feel 
compatible with their abilities (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003). It is our contention that WO may 
play a positive role in both mechanisms, as they may either improve work morale by promoting 
long-term contracts, higher occupational standards and the likes, or may bargain to introduce 
organizational innovations that correlates positively with workers’ well-being.  
These arguments may be further reinforced in the case innovations and other firms’ 
investments are associated with on-the job training, whose amount cannot be contracted 
because of the unverifiable nature of firms-specific human capital accumulation (Hashimoto, 
                                                        
1 Abbreviations: N (non-unionized); U (unionized); WO (workers’ organizations); WO-I (workers’ organizations 
and investments); IR (industrial relations); HR (human resources). 
2 The meta-regression analysis in Laroche (2016) supports the opposite hypothesis, i.e., that unions and job-
satisfaction are negatively correlated, although the result seems to be biased by unsolved endogeneity issues. 
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1981, Hashimoto and Yu, 1980). In this context, the presence of WO may reduce the moral 
hazard problem in financing training by reducing inefficient job destruction and, then, favoring 
optimal level of firms’ investment—given the complementarities between on the job training 
and innovations—i.e leading to social efficiency. 
The character of IR plays also a crucial role. More conflictual systems of industrial relation 
have been theorized to worsen the hold-up problem, as firms are likely to diminish (increase) 
their investments when they expect their labor force to oppose (favour) the introduction of new 
technologies (Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen, 2003). WO with little bargaining power thus, 
may find strategical to mitigate the industrial conflict and improve the non-monetary facets of 
job-satisfaction, thus stimulating investments via the feedback effect mentioned above. 
Addison and Teixeira (2019), for instance, found that work councils reduce strikes incidence 
only when they are not dominated by unions. This suggests that the WO bargaining power has 
a major effect on the character of the IR.  
This lack of theoretical consensus has been nurtured by the mixed empirical evidence. 
Although most studies suggest that rent-seeking depresses firms’ investments—see Card et al. 
(2016)—both Machin and Wadhwani (1991) and Addison et al. (2007) find no support to this 
hypothesis. The divide emerges even more clearly investigating the effect of WO on R&D. With 
few exceptions (Walworth, 2010), the WO-R&D correlation appears negative for North-
America, and either neutral or slightly negative—but often lacking statistical significance—for 
the EU. Commentators have explained this “Atlantic divide” in institutional terms—see 
Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003). Recent support comes from Addison et al. (2016) and 
Bradley et al. (2016).  
In this paper, we study a theoretical model where WO affect firms’ investments through 
an indirect effect on labor productivity. The idea is simple: if WO have positive repercussions 
on workers’ well-being who reciprocate by exerting higher efforts, investment returns may be 
higher in unionized than in non-unionized firms. By allowing utility-maximizing workers to 
choose their effort for a given wage and effort cost, we not only account for the possibility that 
higher wages may translate in higher participation, but also that a relative increase (decrease) 
in the cost of effort due to the presence of WO may translate in lower (higher) participation 
levels. The character of the IR is key to this mechanism. Under given combinations of the union’s 
bargaining power and the character of the IR, we find that the traditional hold-up view no 
longer survives, and WO foster rather than inhibit investments. 
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We hence provide a conceptual contribution—see Klein and Potosky (2019)—to the 
debate on the desirability of WOs as a mediating body within HR relationships, in at least three 
ways: first, we provide a critical analysis of WOs as we challenge the conventional wisdom that 
they have a negative effect upon employers’ willingness to invest. Second, we do this by 
combining existing theories within a unique framework for the analysis. Third, through the 
combination of different theories we are also able to obtain a refinement of the overall analytical 
picture, inasmuch as we clearly identify the conditions—in terms of WOs’ power and industrial 
relations climate—when workers’ organizations favour the employers’ willingness to invest. 
 
2. A unified view 
In the economy there are two firms, a U- and a N- firm. Both employ a single unit of labor 
and optimally make investment decisions given labor productivity. Investment returns are 
given by 𝑓(𝐼) weighted by worker’s effort 0 ≤ 𝑒 ≤ 1. According to standard assumptions, 
𝑓′(𝐼) > 0  and 𝑓′′(𝐼) < 0. Moreover, 𝑓(0) = 0. 
Following Stark and Hyll (2001), we model the worker’s behavior through a “reaction 
function” that determines the optimal effort for a given wage. Both firms pay their worker an 
exogenously given fraction 0 < 𝑥 < 1 of their returns3. In addition, WO transfer an extra share 
0 < 𝑦 < 1 − 𝑥 of the rent to the U-worker, thus reducing investments returns. As such, 𝑦 is a 
measure of the union’s bargaining power. We then define 𝑤𝑁 = 𝑥𝑓(𝐼) and 𝑤𝑈 = (𝑥 + 𝑦)𝑓(𝐼). 
The workers’ problem writes: 
max
1≤𝑒≤0
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖𝑒 − ℎ𝑖𝑒
2 , 𝑖 = 𝑈,𝑁                                                    (1)  
where ℎ𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 = 𝑈,𝑁 measures the firm-specific effort cost. As is common, we assume the 
disutility of working to be increasing and convex in 𝑒 (Stark and Hyll, 2001; Swank, 2016).  
Plugging 𝑤𝑁 and 𝑤𝑈  in (1), we obtain the workers’ optimal efforts: 
𝑒𝑈
∗ =
(𝑥 + 𝑦)𝑓(𝐼)
2ℎ𝑈
                                                                    (2) 
                                                        
3 We keep 𝑥 exogenous to allow for external factors, such as labor market institutions, to determine sub-optimal 
wages. 
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𝑒𝑁
∗ =
𝑥𝑓(𝐼)
2ℎ𝑁
                                                                         (3) 
The profit-functions of the 𝑈- and of the 𝑁-firm are given by: 
Π𝑈 = 𝑒𝑈(1 − 𝑥 − 𝑦)𝑓(𝐼) − 𝐶𝐼                                                   (4) 
Π𝑁 = 𝑒𝑁(1 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝐼) − 𝐶𝐼                                                       (5) 
where 𝐶 > 0 is the unitary investment costs. Plugging (2) into (4) and (3) into (5), we derive 
the f.o.c. for optimal investments: 
𝑥 + 𝑦
2ℎ𝑈
(1 − 𝑥 − 𝑦)
𝜕𝑓2(𝐼)
𝜕𝐼
= 𝐶                                                      (6) 
𝑥
2ℎ𝑁
(1 − 𝑥)
𝜕𝑓2(𝐼)
𝜕𝐼
= 𝐶                                                         (7) 
where 
𝜕𝑓2(𝐼)
𝜕𝐼
> 0 and 
𝜕2𝑓2(𝐼)
𝜕2𝐼
< 0 by assumption4. By assuming that an interior solution to (6) 
and (7) exists, we denote by 𝐼𝑈 and 𝐼𝑁 the arguments that maximise (4) and (5) respectively. 
To assess the effect of WO on firm’s investments, we equalize the l.h.s. of (6) and (7) and derive 
the threshold level in the WO’s bargaining power for which 𝐼𝑈 = 𝐼𝑁 , which is the value of 𝑦 that 
solves: 
−𝑦2 + (1 − 2𝑥)𝑦 + (𝑥 − 𝑥2)(1 − ℎ) = 0                                           (8) 
where ℎ ≡ ℎ𝑈/ℎ𝑁 . Logically, if the WO’s bargaining power is higher than the threshold, 𝐼𝑈 < 𝐼𝑁, 
while, if it is lower, 𝐼𝑈 > 𝐼𝑁5. However, since ℎ𝑈  may be either equal, larger or smaller than ℎ𝑁 , 
the solution of (8) vary with the value of ℎ. Taking ℎ as a proxy for the character of the IR, we 
say that IR are cooperative if ℎ < 1, that are neutral if ℎ = 1, that are conflictual if ℎ > 1. By 
focusing on the cases for which 𝐼𝑈 > 𝐼𝑁, we can provide with a unified view on the WO-I 
correlation, which is summarized in the following Proposition: 
                                                        
4 This amounts to assuming that 𝑓(𝐼) is “concave enough”. A functional form of 𝑓(𝐼) for which 
𝜕𝑓2(𝐼)
𝜕𝐼
> 0 and 
𝜕2𝑓2(𝐼)
𝜕2𝐼
< 0 would be, for instance, 𝑓(𝐼) = 𝐼𝛽, assuming 0 < 𝛽 < 1 2⁄ , so that 𝑓2(𝐼) = 𝐼2𝛽 , with 
𝜕𝑓2(𝐼)
𝜕𝐼
= 2𝛽𝐼2𝛽−1 >
0 and 
𝜕2𝑓2(𝐼)
𝜕2𝐼
= 2𝛽(2𝛽 − 1)𝐼2𝛽−2 < 0. 
5 An alternative proof of the sufficient condition for 𝐼𝑈 > 𝐼𝑁  appears in the Appendix.  
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PROPOSITION 1—When unions bargain higher wages and employees reciprocate by exerting 
higher efforts, unionized firms may invest more than their non-unionized competitors. This 
occurs when the losses from rent-seeking are more than compensated by the workers’ higher 
participation, which in turn requires that union’s power is not too high. In particular: 
𝛿𝐼 > 0:
{
 
 
 
 if ℎ < 1, 0 ≤ 𝑦 <
1−2𝑥+[1−4ℎ(𝑥−𝑥2)]
1 2⁄
2
if ℎ = 1,0 < 𝑦 < 1 − 2𝑥 and 𝑥 < 1 2⁄
if ℎ > 1,
1−2𝑥−[1−4ℎ(𝑥−𝑥2)]
1 2⁄
2
< 𝑦 <
1−2𝑥+[1−4ℎ(𝑥−𝑥2)]
1 2⁄
2
, 𝑥 < 1 2⁄  and ℎ <
1
4(𝑥−𝑥2)
 
   (9)  
From Proposition 1, the following Remarks are worth drawing: 
(i) Since 
1−2𝑥+[1−4ℎ(𝑥−𝑥2)]
1 2⁄
2 |ℎ>1
< 1 − 2𝑥 <
1−2𝑥+[1−4ℎ(𝑥−𝑥2)]
1 2⁄
2 |ℎ<1
, the less conflictual the 
system of IR, the wider the range of the union’s bargaining power which fosters firm’s 
investments; 
(ii) max
0<𝑦<1−𝑥
𝛿𝐼 yields 𝑦
∗ =
1−2𝑥
2
, which is the degree of union power which maximizes the 
difference between the U and the N-investments. Since 
1−2𝑥−[1−4ℎ(𝑥−𝑥2)]
1 2⁄
2
<
1−2𝑥
2
<
1−2𝑥+[1−4ℎ(𝑥−𝑥2)]
1 2⁄
2 |ℎ>1
, unions may have a positive but sub-optimal effect on firm’s 
investments in all three regimes of IR; 
(iii) Cooperative systems of IR foster firm’s investments even when the union’s bargaining 
power is null. In this case, WO devoid of bargaining power—e.g., work councils—may 
foster firms’ investments. 
(iv) Conflictual systems of IR foster firm’s investments if the union’s bargaining power is 
neither too high nor too low. In this case, rent-seeking acts as an investment-enhancing 
device. 
To derive further insights from our model, we compare the workers’ well-being across 
the U and the N settings. By plugging (2) and (3) into (1), we obtain the equilibrium levels of 
the worker’s utility, which are given, respectively, by 𝑈𝑈 =
(𝑥+𝑦)2
4ℎ𝑈
𝑓2(𝐼) and 𝑈𝑁 =
𝑥2
4ℎ𝑁
𝑓2(𝐼). The 
utility differential writes: 
𝛿𝑈 = 𝑦
2 + 2𝑥𝑦 + 𝑥2(1 − ℎ)                                                (10) 
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Imposing 𝛿𝑈 > 0 and solving for 𝑦, we see that: 
PROPOSITION 2 
(i) If IR are either cooperative or neutral, unionization fosters workers’ well-being 
regardless of the unions’ bargaining power; 
(ii) if IR are conflictual, unionization fosters workers’ well-being if: 
𝑦 > 𝑥(ℎ1/2 − 1) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ <
1
𝑥2
                                             (11) 
Results from Propositions 1 and 2 are combined in Table 1. 
Table 1. When unions raise investments and utility 
 𝜹𝑰 > 𝟎 𝜹𝑼 > 𝟎 
𝟎 < 𝒉 ≤ 𝟏 {
0 ≤ 𝑦 <
1
2
{1 − 2𝑥 + [1 − 4ℎ(𝑥 − 𝑥2)]1 2⁄ }
0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1
  Always  
𝒉 = 𝟏 {
0 < 𝑦 < 1 − 2𝑥
0 ≤ 𝑥 < 1/2
 Always  
𝟏 < 𝒉 <
𝟏
𝟒(𝒙−𝒙𝟐)
  {
𝑦 >
1
2
{1 − 2𝑥 − [1 − 4ℎ(𝑥 − 𝑥2)]1 2⁄ }
𝑦 <
1
2
{1 − 2𝑥 + [1 − 4ℎ(𝑥 − 𝑥2)]1 2⁄ }
0 ≤ 𝑥 < 1/2
  Always 
𝟏
𝟒(𝒙−𝒙𝟐)
≤ 𝒉 <
1
𝑥2
  Never 𝑦 > 𝑥(ℎ1/2 − 1) 
𝒉 ≥
𝟏
𝒙𝟐
  Never  Never  
 
3. Conclusions 
In this paper, we provide a theoretical explanation to the mixed evidence on the WO-I 
correlation. By allowing WO to have indirect effects on productivity, we find that the hold-up 
problem does not necessarily survive and that rent-seeking by unions may even encourage 
firms’ investments. This possibility crucially depends on the climate of IR: the more conflictual 
it is, the lower the possibility that rent-seeking by unions may even encourage investments. The 
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character of the IR, in turn, has a positive effect in our model, as it favorably impact both 
investments returns and on-the-job well-being.  
The policy implications are of primary relevance, as it is not a matter of whether mediating 
bodies such as workers’ organizations favor firms’ profitability and workers’ well-being or 
not—a view that during the last decades mirrored into a declining role for unions (e.g. Bennett 
and Kaufman, 2006) also motivated by their supposed negative effect on HR management 
(Verma, 2006)—but rather a matter of when. Investing in a better IR climate—both at the 
macro (IR in a more traditional sense) and the micro (HR management) levels—is what our 
unified view suggests. Whether this implies a higher share of unionized workers—such as, e.g., 
in Freeman and Rogers (1999)—is beyond the scope of the present contribution.  
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Appendix: a sufficient condition for 𝑰𝑼 > 𝑰𝑵 
 
We have seen that the f.o.c. for optimal investments in U- and N-firms respectively read: 
𝑥 + 𝑦
2ℎ𝑈
(1 − 𝑥 − 𝑦)
𝜕𝑓2(𝐼)
𝜕𝐼
= 𝐶                                                      (1𝐴) 
𝑥
2ℎ𝑁
(1 − 𝑥)
𝜕𝑓2(𝐼)
𝜕𝐼
= 𝐶                                                         (2𝐴) 
From the assumptions that  
𝜕𝑓2(𝐼)
𝜕𝐼
> 0 and that 
𝜕2𝑓2(𝐼)
𝜕2𝐼
< 0, and imposing that 𝐼𝑈 > 𝐼𝑁, the 
following condition follows: 
𝜕𝑓2(𝐼𝑈)
𝜕𝐼
<
𝜕𝑓2(𝐼𝑁)
𝜕𝐼
 
As f.o.c. (1A) and (2A) must hold also at optimal investments 𝐼𝑈 and 𝐼𝑁, it must be that: 
𝑥 + 𝑦
2ℎ𝑈
(1 − 𝑥 − 𝑦) >
𝑥
2ℎ𝑁
(1 − 𝑥) 
from which: 
−𝑦2 + (1 − 2𝑥)𝑦 + (𝑥 − 𝑥2)(1 − ℎ) > 0 
as suggested in the main text. 
 
 
 
 
